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12,436 document(s) hit in 31,850,051 MEDLINE articles (0.00 seconds)

A version of Sternberg's (1966) short-term visual memory recognition paradigm with pictures of unfamiliar faces as stimuli was used in three experiments to assess the applicability of the distinctiveness-based SIMPLE model proposed by Brown, Neath, and Chater (2002). Initial simulations indicated that the amount of recency predicted increased as the parameter measuring the psychological distinctiveness of the stimulus material (c) increased and that the amount of primacy was dependent on the extent of proactive interference from previously presented stimuli. The data from Experiment 1, in which memory lists of four and five faces varying in visual similarity were used, confirmed the predicted extended recency effect. However, changes in visual similarity were not found to produce changes in c. In Experiments 2 and 3, the conditions that influence the magnitude of c were explored. These revealed that both the familiarity of the stimulus class before testing and changes in familiarity, due to perceptual learning, influenced distinctiveness, as indexed by the parameter c. Overall, the empirical data from all three experiments were well fit by SIMPLE.
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PMID:Serial position effects in short-term visual memory: a SIMPLE explanation? 1753 91

SIMPLE (G. D. A. Brown, I. Neath, & N. Chater, 2007) attempts to explain data from serial recall and free recall in the same theoretical framework. While it can fit the free-recall serial-position curves that are the cornerstone of the 2-store buffer model, it does not address 2 classic issues in short-term memory research: similarity effects and presentation-rate effects. Similarity effects in free recall led to important work on organization in free recall, whereas similarity effects in serial recall led to the phonological basis of short-term memory. Presentation-rate effects operate quite differently in free and serial recall. The model also does not consider recall order effects or interresponse times in free recall, which may be problematic.
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PMID:Issues with the SIMPLE model: comment on Brown, Neath, and Chater (2007). 1872 2

Temporal distinctiveness models of recency in free recall predict that increasing the delay between the end of sequence and attempting recall of items from that sequence will reduce recency. An empirical dissociation is reported here that violates this prediction when the delay is introduced by the act of recall itself. Analysis of data from a number of previously published free recall studies shows that when the assumed availability of final list items is taken into account, recency increases across the first few output positions in immediate recall despite the delay introduced by recalling items; no such change, with a trend to decreasing recency, is observed in delayed recall. Simulations are presented, showing that 2 models accounting for recency in free recall, the temporal context model (M. W. Howard & M. J. Kahana, 2002) and the SIMPLE model (G. D. A. Brown, I. Neath, & N. Chater, 2007), are unable to account for this novel pattern of data. Further simulations show that the results are consistent with a short-term buffer contributing to recency in immediate free recall and that ordered probing of items may also contribute to this effect; both of these are consistent with the formulation of a short-term buffer akin to models of serial recall.
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PMID:Dissociating conditional recency in immediate and delayed free recall: a challenge for unitary models of recency. 2019 34

We examine the extent to which retrieval from very long-term autobiographical memory is similar when participants are asked to retrieve from widely differing periods of time. Three groups of 20 participants were given 4 min to recall autobiographical events from the last 5 weeks, 5 months, or 5 years. Following recall, the participants dated their events. Similar retrieval rates, relative recency effects, and relative lag-recency effects were found, despite the fact that the considered time scales varied by a factor of 52. These data are broadly consistent with the principle of recency, the principle of contiguity (Howard & Kahana, 2002), and scale similarity in the rates of recall (Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Maylor, Chater, & Brown, 2001). These findings are taken as support for models of memory that predict time scale similarity in retrieval, such as SIMPLE (Brown et al., 2007) and TCM (Howard & Kahana, 2002).
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PMID:Time scale similarity and long-term memory for autobiographical events. 2070 70

The remarkable successes of the physical sciences have been built on highly general quantitative laws, which serve as the basis for understanding an enormous variety of specific physical systems. How far is it possible to construct universal principles in the cognitive sciences, in terms of which specific aspects of perception, memory, or decision making might be modelled? Following Shepard (e.g., 1987), it is argued that some universal principles may be attainable in cognitive science. Here, 2 examples are proposed: the simplicity principle (which states that the cognitive system prefers patterns that provide simpler explanations of available data); and the scale-invariance principle, which states that many cognitive phenomena are independent of the scale of relevant underlying physical variables, such as time, space, luminance, or sound pressure. This article illustrates how principles may be combined to explain specific cognitive processes by using these principles to derive SIMPLE, a formal model of memory for serial order (Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007), and briefly mentions some extensions to models of identification and categorization. This article also considers the scope and limitations of universal laws in cognitive science.
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PMID:From universal laws of cognition to specific cognitive models. 2163 31

The conditional-recency dissociation between immediate and delayed free recall FR; Farrell (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 324-347, 2010) has critical implications regarding the prolonged debate between unitary and dual-store models of memory. In immediate FR, when the availability of items is controlled for, the recency of the final list item increases across the first few output positions. No such increase is found in delayed FR, with a trend in the opposite direction. This dissociation challenges temporal context TCM; Howard & Kahana (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 46, 269-299, 2002) and distinctiveness SIMPLE; Brown, Neath, & Chater (Psychological Review, 114, 539-576, 2007) unitary models of memory and suggests the involvement of a short-term buffer in immediate FR. We show that this dissociation is confounded with the different magnitudes of nominal recency (i.e., the prevalence of the final list item) found in immediate as compared to delayed FR. By reshuffling output orders and comparing the empirical results to those of a null hypothesis of no output-order effect, we controlled for the greater prevalence of the final list item that has been observed in immediate FR. Under this control, we found no evidence for a dissociation in the tendency to recall the final list item across output positions. This finding suggests that the conditional-recency dissociation imposes no new constraint on unitary models of memory. More generally, we demonstrate how biases that influence measures of output-order tendencies (e.g., conditional recency) can be controlled for, thus yielding "purer" measures of these variables.
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PMID:The conditional-recency dissociation is confounded with nominal recency: should unitary models of memory still be devaluated? 2403 Apr 71

Three memory tasks-Brown-Peterson, complex span, and continual distractor-all alternate presentation of a to-be-remembered item and a distractor activity, but each task is associated with a different memory system, short-term memory, working memory, and long-term memory, respectively. SIMPLE, a relative local distinctiveness model, has previously been fit to data from both the Brown-Peterson and continual distractor tasks; here we use the same version of the model to fit data from a complex span task. Despite the many differences between the tasks, including unpredictable list length, SIMPLE fit the data well. Because SIMPLE posits a single memory system, these results constitute yet another demonstration that performance on tasks originally thought to tap different memory systems can be explained without invoking multiple memory systems.
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PMID:From Brown-Peterson to continual distractor via operation span: A SIMPLE account of complex span. 2538 78

Since McGeoch's (1932) influential article, no accounts of long-term memory have invoked decay as a cause of forgetting. In contrast, multiple accounts of short-term memory (STM) invoke decay, with many appealing to results from the Brown-Peterson paradigm as offering support. Two experiments are reported that used a standard Brown-Peterson task but which scored the data in 2 ways. With traditional scoring (was the entire 3-letter consonant trigram recalled?) performance decreased with increasing delay. With immediate serial recall scoring (e.g., was the first letter recalled first, was the second letter recalled second?), standard position error gradients (Experiment 1), and protrusion gradients (Experiment 2) were observed. That is, when the first letter of the consonant trigram was not recalled first, it was more likely to be recalled second than last. In addition, if a letter from a previous list was mistakenly recalled in a later list, it most likely retained its original position. The presence of such gradients is inconsistent with claims of decay but is predicted by SIMPLE, a local distinctiveness model of memory. Moreover, the presence of such gradients is consistent with the claim that forgetting in the Brown-Peterson paradigm follows the same principles observed in other memory tasks.
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PMID:Positional uncertainty in the Brown-Peterson paradigm. 2573 Jun 41